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I. PROFESSOR PANNIER’ S PROVOCATION
There are several varieties of the “originalist” school of
constitutional thought, but all subscribe in one degree or another
to the belief that a constitutional clause should be interpreted
according to its original meaning or the original intent of its
authors. That original understanding or intent can be discerned
from the text of the clause, the history of its drafting and
ratification and, sometimes, early practices and court decisions
interpreting that clause. It rightly has been called a “grand theory”
because it is simple and clear, explains so much, and it has the
almost irresistible attraction of being anchored firmly in history, a
past illuminated by the writings and speeches of heroic figures—

† Lawyer, Hedin & Goldberg, Minneapolis, Minnesota. B.A., University of
Minnesota, 1964; L.L.B., University of Pennsylvania Law School, 1967. The author
filed an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the Minnesota Chapter of the National
Employment Lawyers Association in Abraham v. Hennepin County. This essay is
dedicated to the memory of Lois Alexandria Anderson Sargent (1904-98).
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1

the “founding fathers.”
Like frontier settlers in the novels of O. E. Rölvaag, lawyers,
legal scholars and jurists who attempt to interpret Minnesota’s
Constitution on the basis of its original understanding or the
framers’ intent encounter unexpected hardships, hazards, and
deprivations. This article explores practical reasons why a strict
originalist interpretation of the Minnesota Constitution has never
taken hold, and probably never will. It does not address the
worthiness of the originalist school of adjudication at all. It is both
provoked and inspired by an essay published in these pages a year
ago by Professor Russell Pannier on the decision of the Minnesota
2
Supreme Court in the case of Abraham v. Hennepin County. There,
the court held that an employee claiming retaliatory discharge
under the state “whistleblower act” had a right to a jury trial under
Article 1, section 4 of the Minnesota Constitution.3 Professor
Pannier concluded that the Abraham court attempted to ride
“originalist” and “non-originalist” horses in the same race; not
mincing words, he found the court’s reasoning “incoherent” and
“internally inconsistent.”4 But there is another view of Abraham,
that with it, the court boldly built a contemporary structure for the
analysis of the jury right that is faithful to the democratic order and
harmonious with this state’s constitutional past.
II. THE DUAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS
The starting point for any originalist is the constitution and
5
the records of the deliberations of the founders. Looking back at
1. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY:
THE M ISGUIDED Q UEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 13 (2002).
2. 639 N.W.2d 342 (Minn. 2002); Russell Pannier, Essay: Abraham’s Theory of
Constitutional Interpretation, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 265 (2002).
3. Abraham, 639 N.W.2d at 348.
4. Pannier, supra note 2, at 285-86.
5. Pannier summarizes the “originalist” conception of a constitution as:
. . . (1) a set of legal principles, which are (2) expressed in terms of
particular sentences, that, in turn, are (3) contained in a particular
historical document, and (4) whose semantical meanings are functions
of the particular historical context in which that document was adopted,
including at the very least the particular intentions of those responsible
for choosing those particular sentences to express those intentions.
Id. at 283 (citing ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 17-18 (2d ed. 2002)). For a description of the “original meaning” school
of thought, see ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 38 (1997) (“What I look for in the Constitution is precisely what I
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the formation of Minnesota’s constitution, we see somewhat of a
mess, to put it kindly. The constitution Minnesota had when it
became a state on May 11, 1858, was a compromise document
resulting from two bitterly divided conventions. Convened on July
13, 1857, in St. Paul, the constitutional convention split along party
lines into separate “wings” so fast that one historian concluded,
6
“[it] did not at any time have a real meeting as a whole.”
According to Harlan P. Hall, a newspaper reporter who was
covering the proceedings, tensions were so high that “[an] open
outbreak between the respective bodies was anticipated, and many
members of both bodies went armed, to be prepared for any
7
emergency.”
The dual conventions almost became dueling
conventions. Professor William Anderson, the foremost historian
of the constitution, described the charter’s birth:
[T]he original state constitution was not drawn up in that
calm and deliberate manner which is essential to a good
result. The conventions themselves, although stormy
enough, spent some weeks in constitutional discussions,
but the constitution did not result directly from their
debates. Instead, the raw materials which they had
produced were turned over to a separate conference
committee of ten members. This body met in secret and
kept no record of its proceedings. To a considerable
extent it chose sections which had emanated from the
Democratic wing, and to a less extent those which the
Republicans had produced, but much of the document
finally put forth was different from what either wing had
adopted. The published debates of the two wings of the
convention are, therefore, of little value in explaining the
provisions and phraseology of the constitution, and they
have been only infrequently cited. The real constitution
was somewhat hastily pieced together, in a little over one
week, by the conference committee, and was then passed
by both wings within twenty-four hours, without change
and almost without debate. As one member put it, “This
is a dose that has got to go down, and we might as well
shut our eyes and open our mouth and take it.” And so it

look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text, not what the original
draftsmen intended.”).
6. William Anderson, The Constitution of Minnesota, 5 M INN. L. REV. 407, 420
(1921); see also WILLIAM WATTS FOLWELL, 1 HISTORY OF M INNESOTA 398-400 (1921).
7. HARLAN P. HALL, H. P. HALL’ S OBSERVATIONS 20 (4th ed. 1905).
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8

was done.
At the election on October 13, 1858, eligible voters ratified the
9
constitution by a wide margin, 30,055 to 571. Admitted in 1858,
Minnesota was the thirty-second state in the Union.
Minnesota’s constitutional convention was so dysfunctional
that the state supreme court has been reluctant to rest its rulings
on the deliberations of the delegates. In 1858 and again in 1861,
Justice Charles Flandrau referred to both wings and their presiding
10
officers by name. In 1864, the propriety of relying on the debates
was endorsed by Chief Justice LaFayette Emmett, but the following
year, his successor, Chief Justice Thomas Wilson, a member of the
Republican wing, declared that the debates were not proper
11
authority.
In 1892, Justice William Mitchell mentioned the
12
Democratic debates when interpreting Article 10, section 3. In
1908, Justice Charles Lewis mentioned “the constitutional debates”
while construing Article 4, section 5, but did not name either wing
13
of the convention.
In recent years, the supreme court has
mentioned the debates as historical background, tacitly
acknowledging the futility of ascertaining from them the true
intentions of the delegates. To illustrate, in 1993, the court
rejected a challenge to the school system under Article 13, which
14
guarantees “a general and uniform system of public schools.” It
quoted proposals on public education from both the Republican
and Democratic caucuses, but noted “[n]either of the [two]
proposed drafts at the constitutional convention included the
15
present language ‘general and uniform.’”
As suggested by
8. William Anderson, The Need for Constitutional Revision in Minnesota, 11
M INN. L. REV. 189, 191 (1927). Two constitutions emerged from the process, a
Democratic version, reprinted in 1 M INN. STAT. ANN. 161-197 (1976), and a
Republican version, reprinted in 1 M INN. STAT. ANN. 199-239 (1976).
9. Anderson, supra note 6, at 426. One reason for the lopsided vote was that
the ballots were designed to bar votes against statehood. Id. at 426-27.
10. Roos v. State ex rel. Swenson, 6 Minn. 428, 434-35, 6 Gil. 291, 294 (1861);
Bd. of Supervisors of Ramsey County v. Heenan, 2 Minn. 330, 336, 2 Gil. 281, 287
(1858).
11. Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107, 108, 10 Gil. 81, 99 (1865) (Wilson, C.J.);
Crowell v. Lambert, 9 Minn. 283, 286, 2 Gil. 267, 276-77 (1864) (Emmett, C.J.).
12. Willis v. St. Paul Sanitation Co., 48 Minn. 140, 154, 50 N.W. 1110, 1113
(1892).
13. State v. Scott, 105 Minn. 513, 516, 117 N.W. 1044, 1045 (1908) (Lewis, J.).
14. Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 315 (Minn. 1993) (citing M INN. CONST.
art. 13, § 1); see also In re Haggerty, 448 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn. 1989) (citing the
constitutional debates as background, not as a sign of the framers’ intent).
15. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 309.
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Professor Anderson, those critical words came from the secret
conference committee that kept no records (which raises the
question why, if they wanted their intentions to control future
generations of jurists, they did not memorialize their
deliberations).
In Minnesota, therefore, the reliability of one pillar of the
originalist’s structure—the constitutional debates—is questionable.
But there remain the territorial records. After all, Minnesota had
been a territory with an established court system and set of laws a
dozen years before statehood; and it was in Abraham that the
supreme court stated that Article 1, section 4 “is intended to
continue, unimpaired and inviolate, the right to trial by jury as it
existed in the Territory of Minnesota when the constitution was
16
adopted in 1857.” To Professor Pannier, this suggested “the
17
invocation of an originalist method.”
III. MINNESOTA’ S TERRITORIAL LAW:
“A MESS OF INCONGRUOUS IMPERFECTION”
For the originalist, territorial records are legitimate sources of
original intent or meaning because the transitional “schedule”
following Article 16 of Minnesota’s 1857 constitution decreed that
“all laws now in force in the territory of Minnesota” shall remain in
18
force. Moreover, individual justices have referred to territorial
19
law when construing the 1857 constitution. As in the case of the
16. Abraham v. County of Hennepin, 639 N.W.2d 342, 348 (Minn. 2002)
(citing Olson v. Synergistic Technologies Bus. Sys., Inc., 628 N.W.2d 142, 148
(Minn. 2001) (Anderson, Russell, J., concurring) and Whallon v. Bancroft, 4
Minn. 109, 111, 4 Gil. 70, 74 (1860)).
17. Pannier, supra note 2, at 282.
18. Section 2 of the schedule provides, “All laws now in force in the territory
of Minnesota not repugnant to this constitution shall remain in force until they
expire by their own limitation or be altered or repealed by the legislature.”
According to Judge Haycraft, the “so-called schedule to the constitution could
hardly be said to be a part of that instrument. There was nothing permanent in it.
The object seemed to have been to provide for the transfer of the territorial
government to the state government.” Julius E. Haycraft, Territorial Existence and
Constitutional Statehood of Minnesota, 1 M INN. STAT. ANN. 145, 157 (1946). The
schedule was repealed by Article 16, section 13 of the 1974 Restructuring of the
constitution. Its transitional purpose was cited frequently by the supreme court in
cases decided years after statehood, even as late as 1916, in City of St. Paul v.
Oakland Cemetery Ass’n, 134 Minn. 441, 445, 159 N.W. 962, 963 (1916), where it
held that public burial grounds are exempt from taxation.
19. See, e.g., State v. Bishop Seabury Mission, 90 Minn. 92, 96-97, 95 N.W. 882,
883 (1903) (Brown, J.); Bd. of Supervisors of Ramsey County v. Heenan, 2 Minn.
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constitutional debates, however, the originalist who seeks to find
“original intent or meaning” in the laws of the Minnesota territory,
whether statutory or common, encounters almost insurmountable
historical hazards and deprivations. For good reason, Associate
Justice David Cooper of the territorial supreme court, in an address
to newly admitted lawyers in August 1849, called the state of
20
territorial law “a mess of incongruous imperfection.” In their
legal history of territorial courts and law, Professor William Wirt
Blume and Elizabeth Gasper Brown wrote, “[d]ue to the practice of
creating new territories out of old ones, law developed in one
territory was in many instances transmitted to another, and
21
sometimes to several territories in sequence.” Minnesota was the
receptacle of the laws of many other jurisdictions. The Minnesota
Territory was created from the Wisconsin Territory in 1849 by the
22
Organic Act.
Wisconsin had been taken from the Michigan
23
Territory in 1836, and the laws of the latter applied to the former.
The Michigan Territory in turn was separated from the Indiana
Territory in 1805, and the Indiana Territory was carved from the
330, 333, 2 Gil. 281, 284 (1858) (Flandrau, J., dissenting) (“I will examine whether
the framers of the constitution intended the provisions of sections 13, 20 and 27 of
art. 4, or any of them above cited, to be merely directory upon the legislature.
This investigation will lead me to a review of the legislation as practised [sic]
previously in the territory. Such changes as are instituted by the constitution, and
departures from established practices when we were acting without any
constitution but that of the United States and the Organic Act, must be considered
as providing for some deficiency or intended to check some abuse which existed
previously in the legislative department.”).
20. HIRAM F. STEVENS, Judge David Cooper’s Celebrated Charge to the Grand Jury, in
1 HISTORY OF THE BENCH AND BAR OF M INNESOTA 20, 28-29 (1904). Judge Cooper
was quite candid:
Coming to the bench, gentlemen, young as I am—the youngest superior
judge in the union—and under the circumstances that I do, I shall
necessarily need much indulgence at your hands. The statutory
provisions of the Territory of Wisconsin, until within a few weeks, I had
never seen; and, such a mess of incongruous imperfections as they are,
it cannot be expected that I am very familiar with them.
Id. at 28-29. Cooper was then only twenty-eight years old when he spoke to newly
admitted lawyers following his first charge to a grand jury in Mendota in August
1849. Id. at 29.
21. William Wirt Blume & Elizabeth Gasper Brown, Territorial Courts and Law:
Unifying Factors in the Development of American Legal Institutions II, 61 M ICH. L. REV.
467, 468-69 (1963).
22. Organic Act, ch. 121, § 12, 9 STAT. 403 (1849), reprinted in 1 M INN. STAT.
xxxvii (2002).
23. Blume & Brown, supra note 21, at 495 (The Wisconsin Organic Act of
1836 “provided that ‘the existing laws of the Territory of Michigan’ should be
extended over Wisconsin until altered or repealed” (citations omitted)).
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Northwest Territory in 1800. The Northwest Territory was
established by The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which contained
24
a rudimentary bill of rights, including a guarantee of trial by jury.
Wording from the Ordinance of 1787 reemerged in the
Preamble to the Minnesota Constitution of 1857 and several
25
articles. Professor Blume and Ms. Brown deduced that the federal
act creating Wisconsin “incorporated by express reference the bill
of rights (Articles) of the Ordinance” and the “Iowa and Minnesota
acts (1838 and 1849) indirectly incorporated the bill of rights by
referring to Wisconsin,” but in a recent study of the state
constitution, Professor Mary Jane Morrison concludes that “the
Northwest Ordinance is an essential part of the state’s
constitutional history, although it is not part of the Minnesota
26
law.” In any event, for the originalist, the Ordinance of 1787 is
part of Minnesota’s constitutional patrimony. On rare occasions,
the Minnesota Supreme Court has referred to the Ordinance of
27
1787 for guidance.
The Organic Act applied Wisconsin law to the new Minnesota
28
Territory. When relying upon territorial law after statehood, the
Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged the authoritative nature
of Wisconsin law. In an 1877 case, Justice John Berry wrote:
24. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, U.S. REV. STATS. (1878), reprinted in 1
M INN. STAT. ANN. 39-45 (1976). Article II of the Ordinance provides in part,
“[t]he inhabitants of the said territory shall always be entitled to the benefits of the
writs of habeas corpus, and of the trial by jury.” Id. at xxxv. The Northwest Territory
was established by act of Congress on Aug. 7, 1789. 1 STAT. 50 (1789), reprinted in 1
M INN. STAT. xxxiii (2002). In 1800, the Indiana Territory was created from the
Northwest Territory by Congress. 2 STAT. 58 (1800), reprinted in 1 M INN. STAT.
ANN. 48-49 (1976). See generally Charles Loring, Historical Review of the Judicial
System of Minnesota, 27 M INN. STAT. ANN. 53, 58 (1947).
25. M ARY JANE M ORRISON, THE M INNESOTA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE
GUIDE 3-5 (2002) (describing how wording from the Ordinance appeared in the
Preamble and several articles of the 1857 Minnesota Constitution).
26. Blume & Brown, supra note 21, at 470; M ORRISON, supra note 25, at 3.
27. See, e.g., State v. Bishop Seabury Mission, 90 Minn. 92, 96, 95 N.W. 882,
883 (1903); State v. Hershberger (II), 462 N.W.2d 393, 399 n.3 (Minn. 1990)
(Simonett, J., concurring).
28. Section 12 of The Organic Act provided that:
the laws in force in the Territory of Wisconsin at the date of the
admission of the State of Wisconsin shall continue to be valid and
operative therein, so far as the same be not incompatible with the
provisions of this act, subject, nevertheless, to be altered, modified, or
repealed, by the governor and legislative assembly of the said Territory
of Minnesota;
ch. 121, § 12, 9 STAT. 403, 407 (1849), reprinted in 1 M INN. STAT. xxxvii, xl (2002).
Wisconsin became a state in 1848.
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The main question presented by this case is whether the
common-law right of a landlord to distrain for rent in
arrear, exists in this state. Section 12 of the organic act of
the territory of Minnesota (passed March 3, 1849,)
provides that “the laws in force in the territory of
Wisconsin, at the date of the admission of the state of
Wisconsin, (May 29, 1848,) shall continue to be valid and
operative therein,” (i.e., in the territory of Minnesota,) “so
far as the same be not incompatible with the provisions of
this act, subject nevertheless to be altered, modified or
repealed by the governor and legislative assembly.” The
constitution of this state, (adopted in 1857,) in section 2,
of the schedule, declares that “all laws now in force in the
territory of Minnesota, not repugnant to this constitution,
shall remain in force until they expire by their own
limitation, or be altered or repealed by the legislature.”
...
[O]ur conclusion is, that, as at the date of the admission
of the state of Wisconsin into the union, the landlord’s
common-law right of distress for rent in arrear was in
force in the territory of Wisconsin, and as such right of
distress is not incompatible with the provisions of our
organic act, nor repugnant to the constitution of this
state, and has not been altered or repealed by our
29
territorial or state legislature, it is in force in this state.
Diligent originalists tracing the lineage of Minnesota’s
territorial law may find themselves across the border in Wisconsin,
but that trek is not without impediments. Shortly after becoming a
territory, the Minnesota legislature passed a comprehensive statute,
the Revised Statutes of 1851, consolidating and rearranging
existing laws, omitting others, and providing that “all acts and parts
of acts, unless heretofore repealed, whether enacted by the
legislature assembly of the late territory of Wisconsin, or the
territory of Minnesota, shall be repealed except as hereinafter
30
provided.” It would appear that with one stroke, the Minnesota
legislature relegated its Wisconsin heritage to history. But that was
not so. The Revised Statutes were patterned after Wisconsin
legislation passed in 1849, and the New York code on pleading and
31
practice. Even after statehood, the Minnesota Supreme Court
29.
30.
31.

Dutcher v. Culver, 24 Minn. 585, 587-90 (1877).
1851 Minn. Laws ch. 137 § 1.
Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Law-Making and Legislative Precedent in American Legal
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had to contend with lawyers who argued that Wisconsin laws
32
affecting their clients had not been repealed by the 1851 act.
For the originalist, early court rulings may be indicia of
original meaning or intent, but legal authorities were not always
available to the supreme court in those days, making even the
justices themselves uneasy with the process. In Mason v. Callender,
an important 1858 case differentiating interest from a penalty in a
promissory note, Justice Flandrau, who had served on the
Territorial Supreme Court, rejected an argument by one party that
Wisconsin law on interest applied, while acknowledging, “I have
33
been unable to find the laws of Wisconsin.” In dissent, Chief
Justice Emmett did not fault the majority because he faced a similar
quandary; distinguishing a California decision, he admitted, “I have
34
not been able to secure a copy of the California statutes.” Justice
Atwater, a member of the first state supreme court, described one
reason for his colleagues’ plight:
The early sessions of the first Supreme Court were held in
a room in the north wing of the old Capitol Building.
There was at that time no law library for the use of the
judges, and we were necessarily much hampered in our
work by the lack of that facility. Often we would have brief
reference to decisions which might be of controlling
weight upon a case under consideration, but it was
impossible for us to obtain any full report of these
decisions. Many cases came before us, especially in real
estate and railroad law, which were of first impression, and
we were obliged to struggle with the questions presented
with practically no aid from the text-books or prior
35
precedents.
History, 33 M INN. L. REV. 103, 142 (1949) (“The Wisconsin Revised Laws of 1849
finally served as foundation for the Revised Laws of the Territory of Minnesota of
1851. The committee in charge of the draft had to complete their work in sixty
days. Consequently they made very few actual changes. In some instances they
preferred to retain the law as it had been inherited from the Territory of
Wisconsin rather than adopt the form which the State of Wisconsin had enacted
. . . . The most significant digression from the Wisconsin statute was the
incorporation of large portions of the draft of the New York Commissioners on
Practice and Pleadings which had been published in 1850.” (citations omitted)).
32. See, e.g., Mason v. Callender, Flint & Co., 2 Minn 350, 372, 2 Gil. 302, 32425 (1858).
33. Id. at 372, 2 Gil. at 325.
34. Id. at 379, 2 Gil. at 333.
35. Letter from Isaac T. Atwater to be read at the Proceedings in Memory of
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These primary authorities are available to a conscientious
originalist, who in an anomaly would know more about legal
treatises and the laws of other states in that era than did the justices
who served at that time.
If a contemporary originalist may have greater access to some
of the statutes and court rulings from sister states than a territorial
justice, that jurist would have greater knowledge of the rulings of
his court than a modern scholar ever could because those decisions
were not always written, and those that were not written have been
lost to history. As Chief Justice Sheran and now-District Court
Judge Baland wrote, “[a]ll told, the territorial supreme court
considered 161 filed matters, of which 119 were decided by
36
opinion, 58 of them written.” Noting Abraham’s reliance on an
Associate Justice Flandrau, in 89 Minn. xxi, xxix (1904). The lack of a more
complete library is one reason why, according to one study, no less than 26% of all
opinions of the supreme court in its first eight years—from 1858 to 1865—“were
without any citations or references to commentaries, texts, dictionaries, or judicial
opinions of any court.” Nahman Schochet, Comment, Minnesota’s First State
Supreme Court (1858-1865), and the Introduction of the Code of Civil Procedure, 11 M INN.
L. REV. 93, 109 (1927).
36. Robert J. Sheran & Timothy J. Baland, The Law, Courts, and Lawyers in the
Frontier Days of Minnesota: An Informal Legal History of the Years 1835 to 1865, 2 WM.
M ITCHELL L. REV. 1, 30 (1976) (citing R. GUNDERSON, HISTORY OF THE M INNESOTA
SUPREME COURT, § V, at 2-3 (1937)). In 1861, Justice Flandrau relied upon a
decision of a territorial court, but admitted, “I am unable, however, to find any
record or report of the decision, and am not certain that the question was passed
upon by the court of last resort.” Roos v. State ex rel. Swenson, 6 Minn. 428, 434, 6
Gil. 291, 293 (1861). There is one other unusual aspect of the territorial supreme
court which may lead an originalist to have second thoughts about relying too
heavily upon its rulings. A territorial judge served as a trial judge, and when an
appeal was taken, he joined the other two judges on the appellate court to review
the case. In Desnoyer v. L’Hereux, 1 Minn. 17, 1 Gil. 1 (1851), Judge Goodrich acted
as trial judge, served on the supreme court after the case was appealed, and
dissented when it was reversed because he had given faulty jury instructions.
Judge Flandrau reflected upon this process in an address to the Minnesota
Historical Society in 1896:
When the territory was organized, its judicial power was vested in a
Supreme Court, District Courts, Probate Courts, and Justices of the
Peace. Three judges were allowed it, a Chief Justice and two associates.
The judges held the trial courts individually, and assembled in banc to sit
as a Supreme Court of Appeals. This allowed a judge to sit in review of
his own decision, which is not to be commended, but did not produce
any noticeable disturbance in the administration of justice that I
remember.
Charles E. Flandrau, Lawyers and Courts of Minnesota Prior to and During Its Territorial
Period, 8 M INNESOTA HISTORICAL SOCIETY COLLECTIONS 89, 98 (1898). See also JAMES
WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW M AKERS 101 (1950)
(noting that some of the Northwest Territories followed the King’s Bench system
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1861 decision in a common law breach of employment contract
action, Professor Pannier suggests that the court’s discussion of the
evolution of the cause of action for wrongful discharge would have
been strengthened if it had tracked down a ruling issued at least by
1857, the “legally relevant year,” on a statutory suit for wrongful
37
discharge seeking money damages. Though unlikely, there may
38
have been such a ruling, but it was not published.
As interpreted before the Reconstruction Amendments, the
federal Bill of Rights applied only to the federal government, not
39
the states. But it also applied to territories which, by definition,
were not states. Minnesota’s Organic Act imposed not only
Wisconsin law but also the United States Constitution on the new
40
territory. The Minnesota Supreme Court, therefore, applied the
standards of the Seventh Amendment to the federal Constitution
41
when it judged territorial law on juries. In 1872, the supreme
in which judges often heard questions of law that arose out of cases they had
previously heard).
37. Pannier, supra note 2, at 274.
38. In fact there was (almost) such a ruling, but it was not cited in Abraham
either because of its obscurity or because it did not fit the court’s historiography—
it was not a case decided by the territorial supreme court, rather one instigated by
one of its members. Aaron Goodrich was appointed by President Zachary Taylor
on March 19, 1849, to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Territory of
Minnesota for a term of four years. Almost immediately citizens charging that
Goodrich was temperamentally unfit for office began a campaign for his removal.
See Robert C. Voight, Aaron Goodrich: Stormy Petrel of the Territorial Bench, 39 M INN.
HIST. 141, 145-51 (1964). On October 22, 1851, President Fillmore, who had
succeeded to the presidency in 1850 after the death of Taylor, removed Goodrich
and replaced him with Jerome Fuller (who was never confirmed). Claiming that
the President had exceeded his statutory authority, Goodrich challenged his
termination by bringing a mandamus action in the Circuit Court for the District of
Columbia seeking $2343, which was his salary for the balance of his term. United
States ex rel. Goodrich v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 284, 302 (1855) (McLean, J.,
dissenting). The United States Supreme Court, per Justice Daniels, affirmed the
denial of Goodrich’s wrongful termination claim on the ground that a writ of
mandamus was not an appropriate remedy. Id. at 320. James Guthrie, the
nominal defendant, was Secretary of the Treasury. See generally 5 Carl B. Swisher,
The Taney Period, 1836-1864, in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE, HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 169-71 (1974).
39. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 242, 250 (1833).
40. Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 121, § 6, 9 STAT. 403, 405 (1849), reprinted in 1
M INN. STAT. xxxvii (2002) (“And be it further enacted, [t]hat the legislative power
of the Territory shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation, consistent with
the Constitution of the United States and the provisions of this act . . . .”).
41. See Whallon v. Bancroft, 4 Minn. 109, 115, 4 Gil. 70, 76 (1860) (“The only
restriction that operated upon the territorial legislature, in regard to the right of
trial by jury, was that contained in article seven of the amendments to the
constitution of the United States, proposed in 1789 . . . . This clause in the
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court faced a challenge to a state law permitting trial judges to refer
42
cases to a referee for binding judgment. The court declared the
state law unconstitutional because it denied a party a jury trial—in
violation of the Seventh Amendment. The “referral” law, though
passed after statehood, was “first found” in the Territorial Revised
Statutes of 1851, but that in turn had been “taken” from the law of
the state of New York, to which the Seventh Amendment did not
43
apply. As explained by Chief Justice Christopher Ripley:
There was, however, this vital difference between New
York and Minnesota, at the time of the adoption of their
respective constitutions, viz.: that in Minnesota the
constitution of the United States was then the supreme
law of the territory.
The organic act provides that the legislative power of the
territory shall extend to all rightful subjects of legislation,
consistent with the constitution of the United States and
the provisions of this act. Section 6.
....
If the particular provision of the [1851] Revised Statutes
now under consideration was not consistent with the
constitution of the United States, it was, therefore, void at
the time of the adoption of the constitution of Minnesota,
and, also, necessarily void by the latter, as we have already
seen.
....
It would necessarily follow, therefore, that the provision of
the Rev. Stat., ch. 71, § 50, that where the parties to a civil
action did not consent, the court might order a reference
when the trial of an issue of fact required the examination
of a long account on either side, to referees to hear and
decide the whole issue, was repugnant to the
constitution of the United States was in full force within the territory, both upon
the legislature and the courts, because they both acted under the sole authority of
the United States.” (citation omitted)). Professor Pannier writes that in Abraham
the Minnesota Supreme Court “obviously presupposed the existence of only two
possible sources for a right to a jury trial under Minnesota law: State statutes, on
the one hand, and the State constitution, on the other.” Pannier, supra note 2, at
271. This is a fair reading of the opinion, but for the originalist, the Seventh
Amendment to the federal constitution was the ultimate “source” of the jury right
at the time of the adoption of the constitution in 1857.
42. St. Paul & Sioux City R.R. Co. v. Gardner, 19 Minn. 132, 134, 19 Gil. 99,
100 (1872).
43. Id. at 138-39, 19 Gil. at 103-04.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss1/14

12

Hedin: The Quicksands of Originalism: Interpreting Minnesota’s Constitut
HEDIN ARTICLE J ULY 22 FORMATTED .DOC

2003]

9/15/2003 6:55 PM

THE QUICKSANDS OF ORIGINALISM

253

44

[C]onstitution of the United States.
Most of the federal Bill of Rights has been applied piecemeal
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment; today, the
45
Seventh Amendment is one of the few that does not. Thus, in a
historical curiosity, the jury guarantee of the Seventh Amendment
applied to Minnesota before statehood, but not afterward—unless,
that is, Minnesota courts maintained complete fidelity to the
supposed original purpose of Article 1, section 4, which was to
continue the right to trial by jury as it existed in the territory.
For the originalist, there can never be too much history—by
abiding by historical proof of original intent or meaning,
contemporary judges are constrained from reading their personal
views and values into the constitution. Professor Blume and Ms.
Browne, meticulous legal historians of territorial law, reached
conclusions that, in one respect at least, are not compatible with
originalism:
Looking beyond particular developments such as mining
and water laws made by trespassers to regulate the affairs
of trespassers, and detailed modifications of rules
originally English to suit frontier conditions, we find two
general attitudes and resultant influences attributable to
frontier life: (1) A strong desire to have all statute law
published locally so that reliance on laws not available on
the frontier would be unnecessary—codes were welcome;
(2) A lack of “superstitious respect” for old laws and legal
institutions; in other words,
a readiness to make changes
46
to suit new conditions.
That “readiness” to adapt the law to the demands of life on the
frontier was clearly in the minds of jurists in Minnesota in the 1840s
47
and 1850s, but within two decades of statehood, that frontier
44. Id. at 140-41, 19 Gil. at 105-07.
45. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 288 (1947).
46. Blume & Brown, supra note 21, at 534-35.
47. In Tillman v. Jackson, 1 Minn. 183, 188, 1 Gil. 157, 162 (1854), the
Minnesota Territorial Supreme Court recognized that the peculiar conditions of
the frontier required it to deviate from certain common law principles and rules.
Wrote Territorial Justice Moses Sherburne: “The reasons for the old common law
doctrine, which threw about it an odor of sanctity which had no existence in
relation to personal property, lose much of their force in a new country, where
land is quite as easily obtained, and quite as little regarded as any other kinds of
property.” Id. at 189, 1 Gil. at 163. As a member of the territorial and state
supreme courts and, in between, a member of the constitutional convention,
Charles Flandrau would appear on any list of “founding fathers” of the state. In a
1903 memoriam to Justice Flandrau, Justice John Lovely recalled a colleague who
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unwillingness to pay homage to “old laws” seems to have dissipated.
In 1877, the state supreme court made a sweeping ruling:
With reference to the statute 2 Wm. & Mary, c. 5, which
gave the right to sell a distress, (in that respect changing
the common law), we agree with the supreme court of
Wisconsin in Coburn v. Harvey, 18 Wis. 147 [1864]. It is
there held, upon grounds to which we see no objection,
that the common law of a state which had no political
existence before the revolution, is the common law as
modified and amended by the English statutes passed
prior to our revolution . . . . As the statute of William &
Mary was passed long before the revolution, it was held to
be part of the common law of distress in Wisconsin, and,
for the same reason, it is to be held to be part of the
48
common law of Minnesota.
The conscientious originalist seeking clues in territorial law for
the meaning of a clause in Minnesota’s Constitution or the intent
of its drafters faces the daunting task of identifying and weighing
the influences of territorial legislation and extant court records,
the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, the Organic Act of 1849,
Wisconsin law, the federal Constitution, and the law of England as
it existed before the Revolutionary War, but not afterward.
One way to handle the problem of deciphering territorial legal
was decidedly non-originalist:
If Judge Flandrau had not from experience acquired those resources
which only long continued study and acquaintance with the authorities
will bring, he was to an eminent degree possessed of a genius for
judgment, the love of right, the consciousness that law was made for
man, and that the men to whom it was to be applied and adapted were
around him devoted to new conditions and aspirations that could not
be hampered or controlled by restrictions and limitations that had
become effete and inappropriate to modern life.
Speech by Associate Justice Lovely during Proceedings in Memory of Associate
Justice Flandrau (Oct. 6, 1903), in 89 Minn. Xxi, xxxix (1903). Justice Flandrau
may have been one of those “framers” who believed that his “original intentions”
should not be imposed on future jurists as they endeavored to interpret the
constitution in light of “new conditions and aspirations” of the people.
48. Dutcher v. Culver, 24 Minn. 584, 591 (1877). Professor Blume and Ms.
Brown noticed one additional incongruity raised by Dutcher’s sweeping
absorption of the pre-revolutionary law of England into the common law of the
new state: a Wisconsin law, passed in 1839 decreed that “none of the statutes of
Great Britain” should be considered law in that jurisdiction. This law applied to
the new Minnesota Territory through the Organic Act, and through the schedule,
that law “remained in force” after statehood. Blume & Brown, supra note 21, at
508-09 (citations omitted).
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history is to disregard most of it. In 1988, a divided Minnesota
Supreme Court held that state law providing that a defendant
charged with a misdemeanor be tried before a six-member jury
49
violated Article 1, section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution. In
State v. Hamm, the majority declared:
We are convinced that, when Minnesota adopted its
constitution in 1857, the drafters assumed that a jury
meant a body of 12 persons. This court affirmed that
belief as early as 1869. [State v.] Everett, 14 Minn. 439 (Gil
330) [(1869)]. Thus, although our constitution does not
specifically spell out the number required to constitute a
jury, this court has done so in its decision in Everett.
Therefore, a 12-person jury is written into the constitution
by decision of this court as 50if it were expressly stated in the
original constitution itself.
The court distinguished a territorial law permitting cases to be
tried before a six-person jury before a justice of the peace because
they could be appealed to district court for trial by a twelve-person
51
jury.
The majority’s investigation into the drafters’ original
“assumptions” did not lead to pre-statehood Wisconsin law, made
applicable to Minnesota by the Organic Act; if they had bothered
to cross the border they would have discovered the perfect
precedent—Norval v. Rice, 2 Wis. 17 (1853), where the Wisconsin
Supreme Court invalidated a state law requiring a six-member jury
in trials in county court on the ground that it failed to provide
twelve jurors as required by a provision in that state’s constitution
52
that was nearly identical to Article 1, section 4 of Minnesota’s. On
one level, the majority in Hamm followed an originalist method of
analysis, but their historical research into the myriad influences on
the drafters of the state constitution was, to put it diplomatically,
rather abbreviated. The actual, subjective views of the delegates in
both “wings” of the 1857 constitutional convention on this question
are not known, but it can be said with confidence that, if asked,
they likely would have responded by inquiring how other state
supreme courts had ruled on that question—a process we now call
49. State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379, 386 (Minn. 1988) (Amdahl, C.J.,
Simonett & Coyne, JJ., dissenting).
50. Id. at 382.
51. Id. at 383-84.
52. Norval v. Rice, 2 Wis. 17, 23 (1853). Norval was cited in Whallon v.
Bancroft, 4 Minn. 109, 113, 4 Gil. 70, 74-75 (1860), which in turn was cited by the
majority in Hamm, 423 N.W.2d at 383.
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“horizontal federalism.”
IV. “HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM”
In 1857 there were thirty-two constitutions already in
existence—thirty-one state constitutions and one federal—and it
was against this background that the delegates in both camps
conferred and compromised in St. Paul. For the originalist,
understanding where the text of the constitution came from is
essential to the quest for original intent or meaning. One student
of state constitutions cautions that “historical research in this area
53
will typically be of little, or no, avail.”
First, it is necessary to understand a little bit about how
the state constitutional rights provisions came into most
states. For example, Minnesota’s free speech and press
provision, which is similar to the Maryland one . . . derives
in some measure from the Virginia Declaration of Rights
of 1776 and, more importantly, from the Pennsylvania
Declaration of Rights of 1790. That’s part of the essential
history of the Minnesota free speech and press guarantee.
Most of the state constitutions, which are similar to each
other though dissimilar to the federal Bill of Rights, are
patterned after a few of the early state bills and
declarations of rights, beginning with the work of George
Mason in 1776. By the mid-19th century, what you have are
states adopting, lock, stock and barrel, whole or nearly
whole bills of rights provisions from sister states.
Understand that during the formative era in the
constitutional history of most states, individual rights
issues, at least as we think of them, were not burning
issues. The “hot” rights issues consisted of things such as
water rights, mining rights and laws governing “Pinkerton
soldiers.” Beyond that, the central focus of the state
constitutional conventions had to do with structural
governmental issues. Consequently, when it came to bills
of rights matters, the general tendency was to “borrow or
steal” from a neighboring state. In this sense, at the state
level there were no “framers” or “drafters” or even
“founders.” There were only “borrowers.” Moreover,
little, if any commentary accompanied many of these
53. Ronald K. L. Collins, Litigating State Constitutional Issues: The Government’s
Case, 1 EMERGING ISSUES IN STATE CONST. L. 201, 204-05 (1988) (citations omitted).
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duplicative efforts. What this means is that there will be
little or no evidence of “original intent” when it comes to
typical bail, search and seizure, self-incrimination, 54free
speech, freedom of religion, and equality provisions.
The delegates to the Minnesota constitutional convention were
not novel political thinkers, but practical partisans who united only
to achieve their goal of gaining statehood as quickly as possible.
They consulted and copied other state charters when fashioning
the text of Minnesota’s. According to William Anderson and
Albert J. Lobb, authors of the standard history of the formation of
Minnesota’s constitution, there were multiple sources for the text:
It may be said, however, that the Minnesota bill of rights
closely resembles that in the Wisconsin constitution
(1848). Among the chief general sources of the
constitution not to mention the remote Magna Charta
and other famous English liberty documents, may be
listed the Northwest Ordinance, the federal constitution,
the organic act, the enabling act, the Iowa constitution
(1846), the Wisconsin constitution (1848), the New York
constitution (1846) and the contemporary constitutions
of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio. Practically all of
these were mentioned at one time or
another in the
55
debates, and some of them frequently.
It follows that if courts wish to fathom the original
understanding of certain provisions of Minnesota’s constitution,
they must turn to the texts of other constitutions, which had their
own drafters, ratifiers, judicial interpreters, and unique histories.
As is obvious by now, the path of the state constitutional originalist
is not short and straight.
“Horizontal federalism”—the practice of a state supreme court
looking at how the highest courts of sister states have addressed a
particular constitutional problem—is one more reason why strict
originalism has never taken firm root in the constitutional
56
jurisprudence of the states. From its earliest days, the Minnesota
54.
55.

Id.
WILLIAM ANDERSON & ALBERT J. LOBB, A HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
M INNESOTA 131 (1921); cf. State v. Hershberger (II), 462 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Minn.
1990) (Simonett, J. concurring).
56. The phrase “horizontal federalism” was coined by Mary Cornelia Porter
and G. Alan Tarr in their “Introduction” to STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLICYMAKERS
IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, at xxi-xxii (1982); see also Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate and
Independent State Grounds as a Means of Balancing the Relationship Between State and
Federal Courts, 63 TEX . L. REV. 977, 992 (1985) (“To the extent that state courts
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Supreme Court has engaged in horizontal federalism. For the
proposition that the jury guarantee of Article 1, section 4 “is
intended to continue, unimpaired and inviolate, the right to trial
by jury as it existed in the Territory of Minnesota when our
constitution was adopted in 1857,” the supreme court in Abraham
57
relied upon the 1860 case of Whallon v. Bancroft. Here is how
Justice Flandrau explained the purpose of Article 1, section 4 in
Whallon:
The effect of this clause in the Constitution is, first, to
recognize the right of trial by jury as it existed in the
Territory of Minnesota at the time of the adoption of the
State Constitution; and second, to continue such right
unimpaired and inviolate. It neither takes from or adds to
the right as it previously existed, but adopts it unchanged.
Wherever the right of trial by jury could be had under the
territorial laws it may now be had, and the Legislature
cannot abridge it; and those cases which were triable by
the Court
without the intervention of a jury, may still be
58
so tried.
Flandrau cited no authority for this pronouncement. He did
not refer to the two constitutional caucuses (though he did in
other cases) nor any territorial records and practices (though he
59
did in other cases). Instead, in the next three paragraphs of the
depart from federal analysis, it becomes increasingly important for the courts to
communicate with each other about significant decisions affecting fundamental
rights. Horizontal federalism, a federalism in which states look to each other for
guidance, may be the hallmark of the rest of the century.”). Pollock was associate
justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court. In her annotated study of the Minnesota
constitution, Professor Morrison notes that reliance upon the rulings of other state
courts is one of the canons of the Minnesota Supreme Court’s interpretative
methodology. “When there is some ambiguity, however, most courts will consult
the history of the adoption of the clause, sometimes including histories of similar
clauses in other jurisdictions.” M ORRISON, supra note 25, at 14.
57. Abraham v. County of Hennepin, 639 N.W.2d 342, 348 (Minn. 2002)
(citing Whallon v. Bancroft, 4 Minn. 109, 111, 4 Gil. 70, 74 (Minn. 1860)). This is
the statement Professor Pannier asserts embodies an originalist approach to
adjudication. Pannier, supra note 2, at 272. The court also cited Olson v. Synergistic
Technologies Business Systems, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 142 (Minn. 2001), but Olson cited
only Whallon for the conclusion that Article 1, section 4 was intended to continue
the right to trial by jury that previously existed in the Territory of Minnesota. 628
N.W.2d at 148-49. Olson held that promissory estoppel actions, being equitable in
nature, are not actions at law within the meaning of Article 1, section 4, and thus
not entitled to be jury-tried. Id.
58. Whallon, 4 Minn. at 111, 4 Gil. at 74 (emphasis in original).
59. Speaking for a unanimous court, in Board of Supervisors of Ramsey County v.
Heenan, 2 Minn. 330, 335-36, 2 Gil. 281, 287 (1858), a case involving the scope of
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opinion, he cited rulings of the highest courts of Wisconsin,
Illinois, and Ohio, and to the predominance of “article seven” of
the United States Constitution on the conduct of jury trials in the
60
former territory. If there was evidence that any member of the
1857 convention relied upon these authorities when debating and
drafting Article 1, section 4, Justice Flandrau, an active member of
the Democratic wing, did not cite that source.
Professor Stefan Riesenfeld, who made several forays into the
virgin forests of territorial legal history while on the faculty of the
University of Minnesota Law School in the 1940s, once observed
that it requires “much ingenuity and real patience” to locate the
61
sources of territorial law. His words are equally applicable to
the constitutional prohibition against legislation embracing more than one subject
matter not expressed in its title, Justice Flandrau first referred to the Democratic
constitutional wing “presided over by Governor Sibley,” and then to the
Republican wing “presided over by Mr. Balcombe.” He then reviewed abuses by
the territorial legislature, bluntly concluding, “The [new legislative] system is
thorough, and means to secure to the people fair and intelligible legislation, free
from all the tricks and finesse which have heretofore disgraced it.” Id. at 336-37, 2
Gil. at 287-88. Three years later, Justice Flandrau declared legislation permitting
voters in a county to change the county seat in violation of Article 11, section 1
[now Article 12, section 3] of the constitution. The purpose of this article was to
“check” the previous “abuses” of the territorial legislature, which he described in
detail.
During the territorial existence of Minnesota, a very great evil had
grown up in the legislation of the country, consequent upon the
feverish excitement that prevailed for the creation of towns and cities,
and the speculation in lots and lands. It was the constant practice of the
legislature to change county lines, and the county seats of counties from
one town to another, at the solicitation of interested parties, without a
full understanding of the wishes and interests of the people of the
counties affected.
Roos v. State ex rel. Swenson, 6 Minn. 428, 434-35, 6 Gil. 291, 293-94 (Minn. 1861).
He cited both wings of the constitutional convention in support of his conclusion.
Id. There is nothing approaching this depth of analysis of primary sources in his
declaration of the purposes of Article 1, section 4 in Whallon.
60. 4 Minn. at 111-12, 4 Gil. at 74-76. Fifteen years later, in Board of
Commissioners of Mille Lacs County v. Morrison, 22 Minn. 178 (1875), Chief Justice
James Gilfillan added Vermont to the list of authorities, stating that the provision
on jury trials in the constitution of that state, “though differently expressed, is
substantially the same as the provision in the constitution of this state.” Id. at 18182. He then cited a decision of the Vermont Supreme Court on classes of cases
that were intended to be jury-tried. Id. at 182. Before turning to Vermont’s
highest court for guidance, the chief justice quoted Justice Flandrau’s commentary
in Whallon. Id. at 181.
61. Riesenfeld, supra note 31, at 140-41 (1949) (“In some instances the first
revision of a new territory varied but little from the last revision of the old from
which it was derived, in other instances radical departures occurred. In these
latter cases the revisors frequently relied heavily upon the statutes of some other
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those jurists, scholars, and lawyers who attempt to divine the
original meaning or the true intent of the framers of an article in
the state constitution. Justice Flandrau’s comments in Whallon
about the purpose of Article 1, section 4 of the Minnesota
Constitution have been cited and paraphrased in most every
supreme court decision interpreting this article since 1860, but on
close inspection they reflect more horizontal federalism than strict
originalism at work.
Tracing what happened to Justice Flandrau’s foreign
authorities reveals still another reason why originalism has never
made much headway in state constitutional law—the growth of
native precedent. Abraham cited Whallon, not the authorities cited
in Whallon. If the supreme court in Abraham had cited “Norval v.
Rice, 2 Wis. 22” or “14 Ill. 171” or “2 Ohio St. 296” rather than
Whallon, the lower courts would have been astonished, and the bar
utterly baffled. Whallon’s authorities disappear over time, and this
is the result of more than a mere change in juristic opinion style.
Through citation studies, legal historians have learned that it took
some time before supreme courts in newly formed states in
nineteenth century America began to cite their own decisions more
often than those from other jurisdictions. In other words, it took
time for a state supreme court to build a body of its own precedent
it could cite even though that precedent may have relied initially
upon the rulings of other state supreme courts. In Minnesota, this
62
phenomenon appears to have taken about a generation. All of
this emerges in Abraham where the Minnesota Supreme Court cited
its own decisions for the purpose of Article 1, section 4, rather than
examine with “much ingenuity and real patience” original records
and primary sources. Thus the growth of the supreme court’s own
states, and it may sometimes require much ingenuity and real patience to ascertain
the source from which the compilors borrowed.”). For a case study of how this
process of borrowing helped form Minnesota’s garnishment laws, see William E.
Mussman & Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Garnishment and Bankruptcy, 27 M INN. L. REV. 1,
47-50 (1942).
62. Of all citations during its first eight years, from 1858 to 1865, the
Minnesota Supreme Court cited New York law 41%, England 14%, other state
courts 13%, and its own decisions only 15% of the time. Schochet, supra note 35,
at 110-12. Of the total citations during the thirty-year period from 1870 to 1900,
46% were to out-of-state courts (i.e., other state courts, federal courts, and foreign
courts). See Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Court: A Century of Style and
Citations, 33 STANFORD L. REV. 773, 801-04 (1981). For the period from 1905 to
1935, the percentage rose to 50%, and from 1940 to 1970, it declined to 35%. Id.
at 802 (the authors studied sixteen state supreme courts, including Minnesota’s).
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precedents and its practice of self-citation have formed an
increasingly thick layer between it and primary sources such as
territorial practices and records, which, to the originalist, may
reveal the original understanding of a particular constitutional
guarantee.
V. “LAW OFFICE HISTORY”
Most of the literature espousing or refuting originalism is
directed to its use by the United States Supreme Court, very little to
state supreme courts. Indeed, the imbalance is so great that the
suspicion begins to arise that originalism, regardless of its merits,
may be a peculiarly federal phenomenon. While narrow case notes
abound, it is striking how little has been written about the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s more general methods of
constitutional adjudication.
State appellate judges are appointed for many reasons but not
because they hold firm beliefs on state constitutional law. Not
many—and this may be a good thing—assume a seat on the
supreme court having already developed unified theories of the
place of a state supreme court in a federalist democracy or how to
interpret the state constitution. When their interpretative skills are
called upon, it usually is to construe legislation, rarely the
63
constitution. Justice Christine M. Durham of the Utah Supreme
Court once described these limitations:
[F]ar too many state judges continue to be disadvantaged
in articulating coherent principles of law involving their
own constitution.
Force of habit and overcrowded dockets have more than a
little to do with the reluctance of some state appellate
courts to develop a comprehensive judicial philosophy
regarding state constitutional doctrines. Another cause of
the problem is the failure of creative lawyering.

63. Historians of the behavior of state supreme courts have noted that those
having greater discretion over their dockets (i.e., less mandatory review) decide
more constitutional cases than those that do not. The reason is that constitutional
claims are perceived to be more interesting, challenging, and important. See
Robert A. Kagan et al., The Evolution of State Supreme Courts, 76 M ICH. L. REV. 961,
987-90 (1978) (the authors studied sixteen state supreme courts, including
Minnesota’s). The Minnesota Supreme Court gained more control over its docket
in 1982 when Article 6, sections 1 and 2, of the constitution were amended,
creating the court of appeals.
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Despite the growing body of scholarship and case law in
the area of state constitutional construction, it is still true
that most state courts have little to guide their
interpretation of the state constitution than a body of
state case law dependent primarily on the U.S.
Constitution. In other words, most of us on state
appellate courts must start from scratch in understanding
and explaining the significance of individual rights under
our state constitutions. Not only do we lack precedent in
our jurisdictions but also we frequently encounter a
disturbing absent mindedness on the part of litigants and
64
lawyers who frame constitutional issues for disposition.
That “disturbing absent mindedness” Justice Durham saw was
not confined to her court. Several state supreme courts, perhaps
exasperated with lawyers who asserted state constitutional claims
but provided little historical or analytical support, listed
interpretative factors or criteria that should be briefed to aid them.
65
The intent of the framers appears fleetingly in only one.
If such a homework assignment were given to lawyers who base
an appeal on the original meaning or original intent of the framers
of a provision of the state constitution, it is doubtful that many
would receive passing grades. Lawyers are advisers and advocates,
counselors and confidants, not disinterested historians specially
trained to sift patiently through, weigh and interpret ambiguous
primary source materials and to place an event in a larger social,
political or economic context. “Law office history”—that scornful
epithet heaped by the late Paul Murphy and other professional
historians upon lawyers’ use of history in their advocacy of a client’s

64. Christine M. Durham, Filing a Scholarly Void, THE NAT’ L L.J., Sept. 19,
1986, at S-6.
65. State v. Williams, 459 A.2d 641, 650 (N.J. 1983) (citing State v. Hunt, 450
A.2d 952, 965-66 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J. concurring)) (“We have not hesitated to
recognize and vindicate individual rights under the State Constitution where our
own constitutional history, legal traditions, strong public policy and special state
conditions warrant such action.”). To determine whether broader rights should
be extended under their state constitution than the federal, the Washington
Supreme Court listed six “non-exclusive” criteria in State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808,
812-13 (Wash. 1986): (1) the textual language of the state constitution, (2)
differences in the texts of parallel provisions of the federal and state constitutions,
(3) constitutional history, (4) preexisting state law, (5) structural differences, and
(6) matters of particular or local concern. These cases suggest the real place of
original intent or meaning in the lexicon of considerations of state supreme courts
when they interpret the bills of rights in their state charters: it is not an exclusive
methodology; rather, it is only one factor among many, and a minor one at that.
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cause—is inherently unreliable. A prized skill of an appellate
lawyer is how to use effectively the forty-five pages permitted for an
appellate brief due in thirty days. Very few would allot a portion of
that precious space to an argument based on records of the
territorial government of the 1850s, or a Wisconsin law that
predated the 1857 constitution. For all of these reasons, practicing
lawyers are ill-equipped to competently brief the supreme court on
the original understanding or the original intent of the drafters of
a particular article of the state constitution.
VI. THE “NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM”
As reincarnated in the 1970s, originalism was a reaction
67
against the Warren Court.
For many of its proponents,
originalism’s great strength is that it limits judicial activism—by
strictly adhering to the original intent of the framers of the
constitution, federal judges are restrained from imposing their own
values onto the citizenry through the guise of constitutional
68
interpretation. On the state court level, which is the focus of this
essay, originalism has had to contend with a powerful
countervailing intellectual current which sought to perpetuate, or
at least not retreat from, the Warren Court’s protection of
individual rights and civil liberties, albeit in a different forum. In
the 1970s, as more conservative jurists were appointed to the
66. Paul L. Murphy, Time to Reclaim: The Current Challenge of American
Constitutional History, 69 AM. HIST. REV. 64, 77 (1963) (quoting Howard J.
Graham). If lawyers lack the training and discipline of professional historians,
judges do as well.
Knowing that historians may spend years laboriously
researching an aspect of constitutional history before submitting a paper for
publication, many state court judges, already engulfed in complex cases requiring
rulings within a few months, would be reluctant to issue an opinion based on a
hurried inquiry into original understanding or intent. Even Professor Richard S.
Kay, a staunch proponent of originalism, admits it is easier said than done:
Adherence to the original intentions is neither theoretically impossible
nor so practically difficult that attempts at it are futile. This is not to say
that it will always be an obvious or easy technique. Sometimes it will be
easy, but in many cases it will require an intense, thorough and sensitive
assimilation of much historical information.
Richard S. Kay, Adherence to Original Intent in Constitutional Adjudication: Three
Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 257 (1988) (citations omitted).
67. HERMAN BELZ, A LIVING CONSTITUTION OR FUNDAMENTAL LAW? 221-72
(1998) (sketching history of originalism and its critics from the mid-1970s to the
early 1990s).
68. Pannier, supra note 2, at 266; Kay, supra note 66, at 288 (contending that
originalism “constrains” judges more than any other “alternative method of
interpretation”).
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United States Supreme Court and the lower federal courts, some
judges, many scholars, and a few practicing lawyers resurrected the
notion that state supreme courts should interpret their state
charters to recognize individual rights and freedoms that were
greater than those under the federal constitution, thereby
supposedly preserving the state’s historic function as a first-line
69
guarantor of individual rights. This movement has been called
70
the “new judicial federalism.” In its original ambitions, it was the
antithesis of originalism.
This movement was encouraged by the United States Supreme
Court’s ruling in 1983 in Michigan v. Long that it would not accept
review of an appeal from a state court that clearly and
71
unambiguously rested its ruling on state law. To avoid federal
review, a state supreme court need only make a “plain statement”
that it cited federal law just as “guidance” or indicate that there was
a “separate, adequate and independent” ground in state law for its
69. Friedman v. Comm’r of Public Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 830 (Minn. 1991)
(Yetka, J.) (“In recent years, as the United States Supreme Court has retrenched
on Bill of Rights issues, state courts have begun to interpret expansively the rights
guaranteed under their own constitutions.”). The belief that “[s]tate courts are,
and should be, the first line of defense for individual liberties within the federalist
system” was affirmed by Justice C. Donald Peterson in State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d
722, 726 (Minn. 1985).
70. The literature on the new judicial federalism is vast. G. Alan Tarr, The
New Judicial Federalism in Perspective, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1097, 1097 n.3 (1997).
For an argument that the Minnesota Supreme Court should view the state Bill of
Rights as “a dynamic document, open to innovative interpretation and expansion,”
see Terrence J. Fleming & Jack Nordby, The Minnesota Bill of Rights: “Wrapt in the
Old Miasmal Mist,” 7 HAMLINE L. REV. 51, 77 (1984), noted in State v. Fuller, 374
N.W.2d at 726 n.1, and Friedman v. Comm’r of Public Safety, 473 N.W.2d at 830.
The authors devote only two paragraphs bolstered by several long footnotes to the
history of the Minnesota Constitution. Id. at 70-72. For a more cautious approach
to the growth of an independent body of Minnesota constitutional law, see Lisa M.
Wiencke, Note, Invoking the State Constitution to Invalidate Legislation: Who’s Guarding
the Guardians?, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1073 (1992). The author devotes one
short paragraph to the history of the Minnesota Constitution. Id. at 1106. See also
Melissa Sheridan & Bradford S. Delapena, Individual Liberties Claims: Promoting a
Healthy Constitution for Minnesota, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 683 (1993) (urging
criminal defense counsel to use the state constitution as a shield at trial and on
appeal). As might be expected, there was a fierce counterattack to the new
judicial federalism by those who wanted to prevent replication by state supreme
courts of what they considered to be the abuses of the Warren Court. See, e.g.,
Steven J. Twist & Mark Edward Hessinger, New Judicial Federalism: Where Law Ends
and Tyranny Begins, 3 EMERGING ISSUES IN STATE CONST. L. 173 (1990); Earl M.
Maltz, The Political Dynamic of the “New Judicial Federalism,” 2 EMERGING ISSUES IN
STATE CONST. L. 233 (1989).
71. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
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decision. To many observers, Long encouraged state supreme
courts to reexamine and reinterpret their own state constitutions,
particularly their bills of rights. This coincided with the activist
agenda of the new judicial federalists, but not originalism. In
recent times, though the revivalist fervor of the new judicial
federalism has diminished, its attractiveness to state supreme courts
has not.
Not surprisingly, all state supreme courts do not construe
articles in their state bills of rights that parallel federal guarantees
in the same way. Models have been developed by scholars and
some jurists to determine when a state court should rely on the bill
of rights in its constitution to protect individual liberties and, if it
73
does, how it should treat federal precedent. A critical element of
72. Id. at 1041.
73. Robert F. Utter, Ensuring Principled Development of State Constitutional Law:
Responsibilities for Attorneys and Courts, 1 EMERGING ISSUES IN STATE CONST. L. 217,
222-24 (1988); Linda B. Matarese, Other Voices: The Role of Justices Durham, Kaye, and
Abrahamson in Shaping the “New Judicial Federalism,” 2 EMERGING ISSUES IN STATE
CONST. L. 239, 246-52 (1989); John M. Devlin, State Constitutional Autonomy Rights
in An Age of Federal Retrenchment: Some Thoughts on the Interpretation of State Rights
Derived from Federal Sources, 3 EMERGING ISSUES IN STATE CONST. L. 195, 233-45
(1990); Rita Coyle DeMeules, Minnesota’s Variable Approach to State Constitutional
Claims, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 163 (1991). At one end of the spectrum of state
court adjudication is the “lockstep” model. Under it, state courts mechanically
follow the United States Supreme Court’s interpretations of federal guarantees
when they interpret their own constitutions. The lockstep model requires state
courts to closely monitor developments on the federal landscape; if they miss a
change in direction, they fall off the beaten path. Under the “interstitial” or
“supplemental” model, the state supreme court first looks to see if the
constitutional claim can be decided under federal law, and only if that fails does it
look to the state constitution. A third model is the “dual sovereignty” or “dual
reliance” approach. Under it, the constitutional claim is analyzed by the state
supreme court under the federal and state constitutions, but it rests its ruling on
both. At the other end of the spectrum is the “primacy” approach under which a
state supreme court initially addresses the claim under the state constitution,
which is viewed as an independent source of rights. If the state constitution
protects the litigant’s rights, the court will not analyze the issue under the federal
constitution; and if the state charter does not protect the person’s rights, the court
decides the issue under federal constitutional law. Of the four, the primacy model
is most receptive to an originalist methodology, but even under it, original intent
is only one factor a state supreme court weighs when determining whether its
constitution protects a claimant. The reality of trial practice reveals the artificiality
in these four models. State supreme courts are almost always reactive bodies—that
is, they respond to the claims that are appealed and briefed. Lawyers, believing
that two claims are better than one, take advantage of Rule 8 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, which permits alternative pleading. Thus, they bring parallel state and
federal constitutional claims arising from the same facts (i.e., one alleging denial
of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, another under Article 1,
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each of these models is federal constitutional law. For its part, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that it considers decisions of
the United States Supreme Court on comparable or parallel
provisions of the federal Bill of Rights to be “of inherently
74
persuasive, although not necessarily compelling, force.” Even in
Abraham, the Minnesota Supreme Court footnoted a method of
analysis of the guarantee of a jury trial in the Seventh Amendment
formulated by the United States Supreme Court that was similar to
75
its own. The reality is that the United States Supreme Court
section 7 of the state constitution). On appeal the state supreme court is pressed
to analyze both claims in the same way. See, e.g., DeMeules, supra, at 181-82.
74. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d at 727; State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn. 1999).
When a particular guarantee of the state constitution has no federal counterpart
(as for example, the “certainty of remedy” guarantee in Article 1, section 8), there
is no federal authority to be considered. Political scientist Wallace Mendelson has
described what happens when the Minnesota Supreme Court endeavors to follow
U.S. Supreme Court constitutional rulings, but does not keep up with recent
developments. In Federal Power Communications v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S.
591, 605 (1944), and Federal Power Communications v. Natural Gas Pipeline, 315 U.S.
575, 606 (1942), the Supreme Court rejected the “fair value” approach to utility
rate-making adopted in Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546 (1898). Five years after
Hope, however, in In re Applications to Fix Streetcar Rates of Fare (Application of
Minneapolis Street Railway), 228 Minn. 435, 441 37 N.W.2d 533, 536-37 (1949),
the Minnesota Supreme Court continued to apply the Smyth formula. “There is
not the slightest indication that the Minnesota Supreme Court had ever heard of
either Pipeline or Hope,” Professor Mendelson wrote in Smyth v. Ames in State Courts,
1942-1952, 37 M INN. L. REV. 159, 163 (1953). The Minnesota Supreme Court
finally embraced Pipeline and Hope in Minneapolis Street Railway Co. v. City of
Minneapolis, 251 Minn. 43, 66-72, 86 N.W.2d 657, 673-76 (1957).
75. 639 N.W.2d at 353 n.17. In 1974, the Supreme Court held that the
Seventh Amendment applied to “actions enforcing statutory rights,” and the same
year it held that the “Amendment requires trial by jury in actions unheard of at
common law.” Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193-94 (1974); Pernell v. Southall
Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 375 (1974). Later, in the 1980s and early 1990s, the Court
issued a battery of rulings applying the Seventh Amendment to statutory claims
that are “analogous” to common law claims that were jury-tried in prerevolutionary England, but it emphasized that the nature of the relief sought by
the claimant was the controlling test. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 420-21
(1987) (while holding a real estate developer was entitled to a jury trial on the
issue of liability for civil penalties under the Clean Water Act, the court wrote: “We
reiterate our previously expressed view that characterizing the relief sought is
‘[m]ore important’ than finding a precisely analogous common-law cause of
action in determining whether the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial.”);
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989) (“[T]he Seventh
Amendment also applies to actions brought to enforce statutory rights that are
analogous to common-law causes of action ordinarily decided in English law courts
in the late 18th century as opposed to those customarily heard by courts of equity
or admiralty.”); Chauffeurs, Teamsters, and Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494
U.S. 558, 570 (1990) (duty of fair representation claim for money damages against
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throws a long shadow over state supreme courts’ willingness and
ability to interpret their own bills of rights independent of federal
law. Indeed, the federal constitution, as construed by the Supreme
Court, is probably the single greatest obstacle to a strict originalist
methodology ever gaining a firm foothold in state constitutional
law.
VII. ABRAHAM
In Abraham, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the jury
guarantee of Article 1, section 4 of the state constitution applies to
statutory claims that seek money damages and that are of “the same
type of action for which a jury trial existed when the Minnesota
76
constitution was adopted, any cause of action at law.” Justice
Russell Anderson, the author of the opinion, confined his textual
analysis to maintaining the distinction between court-tried
equitable claims and jury-tried legal claims, but emphasized that
the standards for determining what are “cases at law” are those of
77
the twenty-first century, not the nineteenth. He did not mention
the state’s convoluted territorial heritage, expressed no interest in
the original intent of the framers of the 1857 constitution, and
restricted his historical analysis to rapidly sketching the
development of the law of wrongful dismissal in Minnesota and
elsewhere since 1860. So much is missing, and we may ask why he
crafted the opinion in this way. Clearly he believes, as all judges do,
that history illuminates the present, but he also may think that too
78
much history clouds it. At the center of the court’s methodology
union triable by jury); Wooddell v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 71, 502 U. S.
93, 98 (1991) (union member entitled to jury trial in a reprisal action under the
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act). By the time Abraham
appeared on its docket, the Minnesota Supreme Court already had developed a
variation of the United State Supreme Court’s methodology. See Tyroll v. Private
Label Chem., Inc., 505 N.W.2d 54, 57 (Minn. 1993) (holding that a statute
authorized claim for subrogation in a workers’ compensation act claim was a “tort
action” requiring trial by jury); Olson v. Synergystic Technologies Bus. Sys., Inc.,
628 N.W.2d at 149 (holding that Article 1, section 4 applies to the “type of action”
that existed in territorial days).
76. 639 N.W.2d at 349, 353-54. This appears to be the “general rule” among
the state courts. See 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 18 at 725 (1995) (citing Tyroll, 505
N.W.2d at 54).
77. 639 N.W.2d at 350 (“The nature of the employment relationship at the
time the constitution was adopted is immaterial to a determination of whether a
claim for retaliatory discharge today is a cause of action at law, and thus caries an
attendant constitutional right to jury trial.”) (emphasis in original).
78. Cf. Edward C. Stringer, Foreword—”May It Please the Court,” 29 WM.
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was a transparently non-originalist test: is a statutory claim seeking
only money damages a cause of action at law by today’s standards?
In his essay, Professor Pannier sounds an alarm: “I suggest the
problem is this test can apparently be used to prove that any
statutory cause of action carries with it a constitutional right to a
79
jury trial.” For many, originalist and non-originalist alike, this is
not a problem—it is a virtue. Trial by jury is widely perceived to be
a keystone of democracy. In State v. Hamm, where a majority of the
court held that the state constitution barred a jury of fewer than
twelve in criminal cases, Justice Lawrence Yetka wrote:
Each and every one of the protections set out in the Bill of
Rights in the United States and Minnesota Constitutions is
important, but two of those are the keystones to which all
of the other rights are anchored; they are the right to
counsel and the right to trial by an impartial jury.
Without the right to a fair and impartial trial by one’s
80
peers, all the other rights could become meaningless.
This rhetorical flourish is absent from the court’s opinion in
Abraham, and again we may ask why. Most obviously Abraham is a
civil case, and though it involved allegations of retaliation by a
powerful governmental unit, it was not a criminal prosecution of
political dissidents. And the justices surely were aware that most
81
civil cases are settled or dismissed, and few tried to juries. There
may have been another reason as well. If the court declared the
right to trial by jury to be the constitutional pedestal on which all
other civil rights and liberties rest, that would have detracted from
and even diminished its broader vision of the state constitution as
an evolving charter, one designed to be interpreted to meet the
needs of each generation—in this case, a need of the those residing
in the age of statutes. Whatever else may be said of Abraham, it was
not, as Professor Pannier charges, “internally inconsistent” and it
M ITCHELL L. REV. 263, 263 (2002) (“Crafting the opinion begins to feel like how
an artist or a composer must feel in approaching a new creation—that it must
clearly and fully express the point being made without saying too much, that the
parts must interrelate, and that it must have enduring meaning.”); Benjamin N.
Cardozo, Law and Literature, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO
339, 341 (Margaret E. Hall ed. 1947) (“There is an accuracy that defeats itself by
the overemphasis of details. I often say that one must permit oneself, and that
quite advisedly and deliberately, a certain margin of misstatement.”).
79. Pannier, supra note 2, at 288 (emphasis in original).
80. State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379, 385 (Minn. 1988).
81. David Abraham and Scott Lennander, the plaintiffs in Abraham, settled
their cases against the county after remand but before their scheduled jury trial.
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does not have “the appearance of logical incoherence.” Indeed,
many will say that in its clarity and boldness, in what was said and
what was not, Abraham is an enduring contribution to the
constitutional law of the state.
VIII. THE EVOLVING MINNESOTA CONSTITUTION
Professor Pannier states that the supreme court in Abraham was
so obviously non-originalist it “might well have quoted Justice
William Brennan’s well-known remarks” on the “living”
83
constitution, which he proceeds to do. But the court could look
much closer to home if it wanted an endorsement of that view of
the Minnesota Constitution. In 1889, Justice William Mitchell, a
towering figure in the legal history of the state, discussed what
constituted “a certain remedy” guaranteed by Article 1, section 8 of
the state constitution:
Again, it must be remembered that what constitutes . . . “a
certain remedy” is not determined by any inflexible rule
found in the constitution, but is subject to variation and
modification, as the state of society changes. Hence a wide
latitude must, of necessity, be given to the legislature in
determining both the
form and the measure of the
84
remedy for a wrong.
Many of Justice Mitchell’s predecessors and successors have
shared this vision of the constitution. In the midst of the Great
Depression, the state supreme court upheld the constitutionality of
the Mortgage Moratorium Act, rejecting a challenge that it
impaired the obligations of the mortgage contract. Concurring
Chief Justice Samuel Wilson wrote, “There has always been a
development in judicial construction to meet new and changing
85
conditions . . . .”
Even in State v. Hamm, Justice Yetka
acknowledged the evolutionary nature of the state constitution:
“The constitution, by its broad and generous language, allows for
such significant changes to be considered by courts in interpreting
its terms . . . . However, unless significant changes in society or
constitutional amendments require another reading, the essential

82. Pannier, supra note 2, at 285-86.
83. Id. at 283.
84. Allen v. Pioneer Press Co., 40 Minn. 117, 123, 41 N.W. 936, 938 (1889).
85. Blaisdell v. Home Bldg. & Loan Assn., 189 Minn. 422, 435, 249 N.W.2d
334, 339 (1933), aff’d 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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protections guaranteed by the constitution must be retained.” In
an introduction to a symposium on the Minnesota Constitution in
the William Mitchell Law Review in 1994, Justice Simonett dismissed
originalism with a swift bang of his gavel: “‘Original intent’ is not a
87
particularly helpful approach.” And in Abraham itself, Justice
Anderson penned an aphorism worthy of Justice Holmes, one
destined to be quoted in the opinions of future generations of
justices: “The constitution is not frozen in time in 1857, incapable
88
of application to the law as it evolves.” There is a distinct strain of
89
non-originalist thinking by state supreme court justices serving
during all periods of the court’s history that poses still another
hurdle to the originalist who seeks to persuade it to adopt this
idealized methodology to state constitutional adjudication.
IX. CONCLUSION
Professor Pannier concludes his essay by advising the supreme
court to choose explicitly between originalist and non-originalist
90
“formulations of constitutional issues.”
There is evidence,
86. 423 N.W.2d 379, 385 (Minn. 1988). In dissent, Chief Justice Douglas
Amdahl was more emphatic: “Our state constitution, like the United States
Constitution, was intentionally written in broad and general terms to allow for
change as society changes. It is not enough to recognize an original intent of the
1857 framers and say that 12 was intended for all time.” Id. at 389.
87. John E. Simonett, An Introduction to Essays on the Minnesota Constitution, 20
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 227, 239 (1994).
88. 639 N.W.2d 342, 349 (Minn. 2002).
89. In his essay, Pannier summarizes the “non-originalist” approach to
constitutional interpretation:
[I]t is legitimate, and perhaps even necessary, for judges interpreting a
written constitution to invoke principles and norms from sources which
have nothing to do with the language of the original document, the
historical intentions motivating that language, the implicit structure
presupposed by the document, or the document’s historical context
. . . . [N]on-originalist sources . . . might include a great variety of items,
e.g., current systematic political philosophies (e.g., John Rawls),
ideologies of current political parties, prevailing attitudes in society,
personal ideologies of judges, and so forth.
Pannier, supra note 2, at 266 (citations omitted).
90. Id. at 293. At the conclusion of his essay, Professor Pannier suggests that
the supreme court should have posed the following question in Abraham: “Does
the jury-trial provision of the Minnesota Constitution, as intended by its framers in
1857, require jury trials for claims brought under the Whistleblower Act?” Id.
Had it done so, he states, its methodology would be “transparent,” and that is good
for democracy. There may be many reasons why the supreme court did not ask
this question, one being that the justices were familiar with Professor Pannier’s
1992 article in these pages in which he skewered on highly theoretical grounds the
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however, that the court has already made that choice: it has been, is
today, and always will be non-originalist. But we too shall end with
advice to the court. On those occasions when it is asked to
narrowly construe a rights guarantee in an article of the Minnesota
Constitution to accord with its supposed original meaning or the
intent of the framers—when, in other words, it is called upon to
venture into the quicksands of originalism—the court may reflect
upon the lyrical prose of Professor Pannier himself:
[The framers] succeed, at best, only in launching vessels of
words down the river of history. What those vessels will be
91
filled with by later interpreters is beyond [their] control.

originalist approach to statutory and constitutional interpretation, and lampooned
the notion that a judge can figure out what a legislator might have thought about
something she didn’t actually think about—as for example what the “framers” of
the Minnesota Constitution would have thought about a piece of workplace
legislation passed 130 years after they held their dual conventions. Russell
Pannier, An Analysis of the Theory of Original Intent, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 695,
722 (1992).
91. Pannier, supra note 90, at 728.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003

31

